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Introduction 
The paper analyses the role of litigation as a strategy to fulfil the social rights laid down in the 
South African constitution. Critically examining litigation as a means to bring the 
constitutional provisions to life, it explores how different aspects of the social, political and 
legal context condition the litigation process. Focus is on the social rights cases that the South 
African Constitutional Court has decided over the past decade. Comparative perspectives set 
the South Africa experience in relief, and inform the theoretical framework structuring the 
analysis.1  By systematically examining the South African experience, the aim is to shed light 
on what has been achieved through social rights litigation; what has facilitated these 
achievements; and future prospects for social rights litigation in South Africa. Furthermore, it 
aims to extract some general insights into the potential and limits of litigation as a strategy for 
advancing social rights.  
What are socio-economic rights? 
I use the terms socio-economic rights and social rights interchangeably to refer to rights 
which correspond to a particular set of international human rights norms, most centrally 
reflected in the UN Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR).2  The 
South African Constitution echo these norms when it recognises rights to housing, health care, 
food, water, social security and education, with special protection of these rights for children 
(in Sections 25-31)3.  Hence, I see these provisions as constitutiona lized human rights norms. 
As such they have a dual legal and normative validity.  Their validity as positive law stems 
from their genesis – being the outcome of a legitimate procedure, in this case a democratic 
constitut ion-making process.4 They can also claim validity as international human rights 
norms, legally binding on states that are party to the relevant treaties, in this case principally 
the CESCR (which South Africa has signed but not ratified). Furthermore, these rights form 
part of the value system that UN member states commit to upon joining the organisation, and  
should be regarded as international common law, binding on all states.  
 
Social rights litigation is here understood as litigation aiming at giving effect to these 
international human rights norms. I will not consider what may be termed “contractual socio-
economic rights”, such as property rights.  
                                                 
1 A modified version of this paper will be published as a chapter in Peris Jones and Kristian Stokke (eds.) 
Democratising Development: The Politics of Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa, The Hague, Martinius 
Nijhoff (forthcoming 2005). The framework was presented to the workshop on “Human Rights, Democracy and 
Social Transformation: When do Rights Work?” (University of the Witwatersrand, November 2003) and the 
seminar on “Making Socio-Economic Rights Justiciable: the South African Experience” (Centre for Human 
Rights, Oslo, October 2003). I am grateful to the participants , and to colleagues in the CMI Courts in Transition 
programme and research network, for valuable contributions. 
2 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), United Nation’s General Assembly 
resolution 2200A (XXI), adopted 16 December 1966. (<http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm.>)  
3 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. (Hereafter “the constitution”) 
(http://www.concourt.gov.sa/constitution/index.html). On the relationship between the South African 
constitutional rights and international human rights norms see John Dugard, The role of human rights treaty 
standards in domestic law: the Southern African experience.” In P. Alston & J. Crawford (eds): The future of UN 
human rights treaty monitoring. (Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
4 See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law. (Oxford, Claredon Press, 1961) on legal validity and rules of 
recognition. 
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By litigation alone? 
Is litigation worthwhile as a strategy to fulfil social rights?  Traditionally, social rights have  
been regarded as a matter to be mobilised around and fought for on the political arena, 
through parties and interest groups, elections and demonstrations, and to be implemented by 
means of social policy. When included in the constitution, they have been regarded as 
(utopian) directive principles for state policy, reflecting political aspirations, not justiciable 
rights to be administered by the courts.  
 
There are arguments to support this view. Leaving issues of socioeconomic rights to judges 
are held to undermine the political process as its very core, running a stick into the wheel of 
democracy, obstructing its proper functioning.5 Questions regarding fairness in the 
distribution of scarce resources, and the adequacy of particular social policies, are at the heart 
of politics. To move these essentially political questions into to the courtroom is  considered 
unacceptable on normative grounds, as well as imprudent.  Judges are not particularly well 
equipped to deal with issues involving economic and social policies, where the room for 
rational disagreement is wide.6 Blurring the line between the legal domain and the domain of 
politics might also do a disservice to the rule of law and undermine the courts’ authority 
particularly in contexts where realisation of these rights for all is a utopian goal. 
 
Sociologists of law argue that litigation is ill-suited as a strategy to advance social rights since 
the legal system tends to favour vested interests.7  Judges almost invariably belong to the 
social elite, and are rarely responsive to the concerns of marginalised groups. And the law 
itself reflects the prevailing power-relations. Hence, courts are unlikely to work in favour of 
the disadvantaged whose social rights are most at risk. To spend energy and resources on 
litigation rather than political mobilisation is prone to be fruitless, even counterproductive, as 
it serves to unduly legitimise the law in the eyes of the poor and hamper prospects of social 
transformation. 
 
These are strong arguments. Against this backdrop, it is reasonable to discard litigation as a 
suitable strategy in the fight for social rights. Yet, those who have followed South African 
legal politics over the past decade may hold a different view. On some crucial social rights 
issues, where the political system has failed dismally to respond to mobilisation through 
political channels – legal mobilisation has achieved significant results. This is most striking 
with regard to the constitutional challenges brought against the governments’ HIV/aids 
policy. 8 And in the Grootboom case, when a poor community forcibly removed off public 
                                                 
5 The metaphor is borrowed from Jens Arup Seip, Fra embetsmannsstat til ettpartistat (Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget, 1974). See also Siri Gloppen South African Constitutionalism 1994-2000: The difficult  
balancing act of the Constitutional Court (Doctoral Thesis, University of Bergen 2001) and  Teunis Roux 
“Legitimating Transformation: Political Resource Allocation in the South African Constitutional Court” in Siri 
Gloppen et al (eds) Democratization and the Judicary (London: Frank Cass, 2004). 
6 See Lon L. Fuller,“The Forms and Limits of Adjudication” 92 Harvard Law Review, 1978, s. 353,  394.  
7 From the 1920s legal realists argued that, contrary to legal formalist beliefs judges do not primarily decide 
cases on the basis of legal rules or principles. What is decisive is how the facts of the case strike the judge and 
what on this basis seems just or adequate. (Brian Leiter, "Legal Realism." in  Dennis Patterson (ed) A Companion 
to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, Oxford: Blackwell 1996: 261-279) Later studies have documented the 
importance of class, race and gender as determinants of legal practices (M.P. Baumgartner, "The sociology of 
law" in Patterson (ibid): 406-420). 
8 Constitutional Court of South Africa, Minister of Health and Others v. Treatment Action Campaign and Others 
(No. 2) CCT  9/02, (18 april 2002). 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC). All the Constitutional Court judgments can be found 
at http://www.concourt.gov.za/. Reviews of all the cases discussed here can be found on the Community Law 
Centre website http://communitylawcentre.org.za/ser/casereviews.php.  
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land turned to the courts fo r relief, the South African courts demonstrated their willingness to 
take seriously the social rights of poor and vulnerable groups.9  
 
South African social rights jurisprudence does not stand out as a counter-majoritarian ‘stick’. 
On the contrary, the courts seem to have removed obstructions to democracy’s functioning, 
without usurping the political domain, and can be regarded as performing their fundamental 
democratic duty of ‘unblocking the channels of democracy”. 10  
 
These landmark and well publicised cases of successful legal mobilisation on social rights 
issues have focused considerable attention on social rights litigation. The South African 
experience has raised hopes, domestically and abroad, regarding what litigation can achieve. 
It is thus appropriate to ask whether this optimism is justified. What are the potential and 
limitations of social rights litigation? Can the achievements be replicated – at other times and 
places – or did they depend on a particular set of social, legal and political circumstances? 
 
To address these questions I first ‘dissect’ the litigation process and discuss factors interacting 
to determine whether social rights litigation succeeds or fails. The framework is subsequently 
used to analyse the South African experiences: To what extent are these factors present? What 
was their impact? A better understanding of factors that were decisive in the past may indicate 
likely future developments, and aid processes of judicial reform. 
The anatomy of social rights litigation 
To understand what enables social rights litigation, it is useful to break the process down into 
stages, as illustrated in figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1: The anatomy of the litigation process  
 
 
(a)  social rights cases brought to court; (b) cases  accepted by the courts; (c) judgements giving effect to social 
rights; (d) impact on provision for social rights 
 
 
The success or failure of social rights litigation depend on (a) the ability of groups whose 
rights are violated to articulate their claims and voice them into the legal system – or have the 
rights claimed on their behalf; (b) the responsiveness of the courts at various levels towards 
                                                 
9 Constitutional Court of South Africa, Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v. Grootboom 
and others. CCT11/00, 2001(1) SA 46.  
10 John Hart Ely Democracy and distrust : A theory of judicial review. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 
1980). 
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the social claims that are voiced; (c) the capability of the judges – that is, their ability to find 
adequate means to give legal effect to social rights; and (d) whether the social rights 
judgments that are handed down have authority in the sense that they are accepted, complied 
with and implemented through legislation and policy.  
 
Here focus is on “successful litigation”, cases that result in a judgement giving legal effect to 
the litigants’ rights-claims. But even if the case is not decided in favour of the claimants, 
litigation may have a positive impact. Authorities threatened with court action may settle out  
of court, and when courts provide a platform for voicing social rights concerns, this may 
generate or intensify popular debate and create a political momentum. This indirect, political 
effect is represented in the figure by the downwards-sloping arrow.  
 
As indicated in figure 1, “victims’ voice”, “court responsiveness”, “judges’ capability” and 
the “judgment’s authority”, represent different stages or junctions in the litigation process. 
The outcome at each stage is in turn the result of interaction between different factors.  
 
(1) Voice  
The first stage of the litigation process is the articulation of rights claims by, or on behalf of 
victims of social rights violations, and the voicing of the claims into the legal system. Figure 2 
indicates factors influencing whether, and how forcefully, social rights claims are voiced. 
 
 
Figure 2: Factors affecting litigants' voice 
 
 
(a) social rights cases brought 
 
To be able to voice social rights claims, victims must be (made) aware of the ir rights, the 
right-violation and the possibility for redress through the courts. People whose social rights 
are most at risk often lack such knowledge. Legal literacy programmes, human rights 
education, and media focus on social rights are essential in providing this.  
 
Those whose social rights are violated must also have (access to) resources enabling them to 
effectively articulate their rights-claims – and to do so in a form that the legal system 
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recognises. Social rights cases often raise complex lega l issues, with few possibilities for lay 
people to effectively argue their own case. Access to legal expertise, through legal aid or 
organisations providing free legal assistance, is thus crucial.  
 
Multiple barriers hamper access to the justice system for poor and marginalised groups. Some 
are motivational and psychological, such as fear and distrust of the courts due to cultural and 
social distance, or negative past experience. Litigation may also be discouraged by 
perceptions of poor performance, delays, corruption, bias – or a belief that court decisions are 
irrelevant. Other barriers are practical, such as the costs of litigating, geographical distance, 
language barriers, lack of information. Yet other barriers are legal and are related to the 
structure and nature of the legal system. The status of social rights in legislation and 
jurisprudence may motivate – or discourage -- the voicing of social right claims. So does the 
degree of formalism and bureaucracy involved. Most systems require detailed formal 
procedures to be undertaken before starting a case, and time consuming and costly appeal 
proceedings  to reach the higher courts. The criteria for locus standi (who can take a case to 
court) vary. Particularly important for poor groups is whether an organisation or individual 
can litigate on behalf of others, and whether cases can be argued on behalf of a group or 
category of people (class action), or only individual cases are accepted.  
 
(2) Responsiveness 
For social rights litigation to succeed, the legal system must also be responsive to the claims 
that are voiced. They must be recognised as a legitimate matter for the court to decide. As 
figure 3 indicates, responsiveness is in part a function of “voice” – the manner, in which the 
claims are articulated, the legal strategies employed by the litigants and the skill with which 
the case is framed. But the responsiveness of the legal system to social rights claims also 
depends on other factors.  
 
 
Figure 3:  Factors conditioning courts’ responsiveness 
 
 
(a) social rights cases brought   (b) cases accepted        
 
 
Again, the nature of the legal system is crucial, in particular the legal basis for social rights 
(including the status of international social rights conventions). And, where social rights are 
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formally recognized, are they justiciable rights or ‘directive principles’ outside the scope of 
the courts’ jurisdiction? The courts’ responsiveness also depends on the legal culture and 
prevailing theories of interpretation. These influences to what extent social rights are regarded 
within the proper domain of the courts and the judges’ perception of their own role – their 
norms of appropriateness concerning how they should deal with social rights. Judges’ 
sensitivity - individually and collectively - to the concerns voiced, also matter. This is in turn 
related to social and ideological background, as well as to education and whether they are 
sensitised towards social rights through ongoing training. 
 
(3) Capability 
The third stage of the litigation process regards the judges’ capability. That judges are willing 
to respond to social rights claims is not enough, they must also be able to find adequate legal 
remedies to repair the violation. This requires professional competence, access to relevant 
knowledge and command of the necessary legal remedies. The range of options include 
"minimal affirmation", merely requiring the state to respect a social right in the negative sense 
of non- interference; courts may rule that the state has a duty to protect social rights against 
encroachment by others; order the state to actively promote particular social rights by 
developing policies to this effect; or they can make concrete orders for state agencies to fulfil 
the individual claimants’ social rights. Furthermore, court orders may be declaratory (stating 
that laws or actions are in breech of a social rights obligation, but leaving to the state to device 
a remedy); mandatory (requiring specific actions to be taken) or supervisory (requiring the 
relevant agency to report back within a set time-frame).11 As indicated in figure 4,  court 
performance depends on the skill and capacity of the judges, and of the jurisprudential 
resources at their disposal.  
 
 
Figure 4: Factors affecting judges'capability 
 
 
(a) social rights cases brought;  (b) cases accepted;  (c) social rights judgements   
 
 
                                                 
11 See Roux (2004). See also Charles Epp, The Rights Revolution (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press,1998) and Herbert Jacob et al (eds) Courts, Law, and Politics in Comparative Perspective (New haven: 
Yale University Press, 1996). 
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To develop sophisticated social rights jurisprudence, requires highly skilled judges, research 
capacity and access to a range of legal materia ls. Professional forums to exchange ideas and 
knowledge may contribute positively, and strengthen judges’ professionalism and 
independence. In addition to the professional, jurisprudencial resources, courts’ capability and 
capacity to deliver social rights judgments depend on the ir independence from the state and 
dominant social interests, and on the financial resources at their disposal. 
 
(4) Compliance  
The fourth stage is compliance. For litigation to succeed in improving the actual social rights 
situation, the judgments must be complied with by the relevant authorities and political action 
taken to implement the ruling. Compliance is again the outcome of a range of factors, as 
shown in figure 5. 
 
Figure 5: Factors affecting compliance with social rights judgments  
 
 (a) social rights cases brought;  (b) cases accepted; (c) social rights judgements; (d) effects on social rights 
provision  
 
 
The authority of the judgement itself is important. This stems partly from the courts’ 
professionalism, independence and legitimacy. Several aspects of the political contexts are 
crucial for compliance with social rights judgments: the prevailing political culture; the 
balance of power between the parties, and, perhaps most important, the political will to follow 
up and give priority to social rights issues. Lastly, implementation of court rulings also 
depends on the state’s capacity – financial, institutional and administrative.  
 
Ultimately, the proof of success is of course whether the situation changes for people on the 
ground with regard to the relevant right. This is not included in this framework, since it is 
notoriously difficult to establish a causal link between particular legal actions and the overall 
social development in a field. The situation with regard to a particular social right (say,  
housing) – is influenced by a wide range of factors (climate changes, violence and unrest, 
economic depression, unemployment etc.). To determine the effect of a particular ruling is 
thus difficult, beyond monitoring direct compliance and trace ‘ripple effects’ in law, policies 
and implementation.  
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Conditions for social rights litigation in South Africa 
Turning to the analysis of social rights litigation in South Africa, I use the framework outlined 
above to guide the discussion. I start by examining factors influencing whether and how social 
rights claims are voiced; go on to discuss the courts’ responsiveness to such claims; and  the 
judges’ capability to give legal effect to social rights; and finally, the factors influencing 
compliance and implementation of social rights judgements.   
Voicing social rights claims 
I start by examining formal, practical and motivational barriers that hamper the voicing of 
social rights claims into the South African legal system, then I go on to look at the resources 
available to potential litigants, before reflecting on how these factors have influenced 
(potential) litigants’ voice.   
 
The structure and nature of the legal system changed quite extensive ly with the democratic  
dispensation. South Africa became a constitutional state, and the 1996 Constitution formally 
recognizes social rights as substantive law, with status as justiciable rights. Effort has been 
taken to simplify the wording of the constitution – and to some extent legislation – to make it 
more accessible to ordinary people. Access has also been significantly improved by more 
lenient criteria for standing. Legal aid institutions can now litigate on behalf of a person – or 
group – whose social rights are violated, and there are possibilities for direct application to the 
Constitutional Court and direct access from the court of first instance, although strictly 
applied.  
 
While access has been made easier, it is not as open as in some other countries, most notably 
India, where a newspaper-clipping or a letter to the Supreme Court may suffice to start 
proceedings 12  In the lawyer-driven South African system, judges can not take up a case on 
their own initiative only pronounce on cases placed before them. They can, however, decide 
which cases not to hear.13 They can also allow or invite particular amicus curiae or friends of 
the court to address the case, thus influencing the arguments heard. In some landmark cases – 
most notably in the Grootboom case - the judgment relied heavily on submissions from 
amicus rather than that the parties’ arguments.14  
 
As a whole, the South African legal system is quite favourable to social rights litigation. Yet, 
the system remains quite bureaucratic and formalistic compared to the low threshold of the 
Indian Supreme Court, and cases are often dismissed on technical grounds.  
 
The nature of the legal system, and experience with, and perceptions of the courts affect 
people’s motivation to use them as an arena in which to voice their cla ims. South Africans’ 
attitude towards the courts and the law is marked by ambivalence. The courts still carry the 
legacy from the apartheid era when they were part of the white state apparatus enforcing 
unjust laws  – but even then, the  picture was nuanced. Human rights oriented judges stretched 
the law to attain justice and preserve political space, and the courts retained a modicum of 
legitimacy.  Transformation has brought a less pale and male judiciary, but sitting judges 
                                                 
12 Ajay Verma “The experience in India” p 149 in Roger Blanpain (ed) Law in Motion  (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 1997). See also Maja K Brix “The Impact of Judicial Activism in India” (MA thesis, Bergen: 
Faculty of Law, June 2004). 
13 But with a light case load, the SA Constitutional Court has limited opportunities to choose the cases they want 
to decide.   
14 In this case the Legal Resources Centre (Geoff Budlender) see (CCT 2000 (11/00): para 19).  
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retained their jobs and “hold-over” judges remain on the bench (some occasionally hand down 
judgments sparking outrage and allegations of racism). The changes in the legal system at the 
time of the transition – including the new constitutional court created to guard the new 
constitution – changed perceptions and expectations, not least in the domain of social rights. 
In the landmark judgment to certify the 1996 constitution, the Constitutional Court affirmed 
its commitment to social rights as rights to be enforced by the courts.15  
 
But also the new, transformed judiciary has faced popular dismay. Controversial judgements 
by the Constitutional Court – abolishing capital punishment, enforcing stricter rights of 
accused and convicted persons, denouncing discrimination of gays and lesbians – has brought 
criticism. The Court is considered “soft on crime” and too liberal minded, eroding traditional 
norms and values.16  Some fear that efforts to transform the judiciary compromises 
professional quality. Problems with backlogs, delays, poor performance and perceived bias, 
particularly in the lower courts, add to the disenchantment. – But there are also strong 
traditions of legalism in South African society, of trusting a judge to hear your case. 
Ambivalence thus continues to characterise South African’s attitude towards the ir courts. This 
includes social rights cases, as we shall see - but first, a comment on the practical barriers 
hampering social rights litigation in South Africa.  
 
Costs of lawyers and court fees, transport, income loss; language barriers, and lack of 
information and knowledge are substantial problems, particularly for the poorest sections of 
society and people living in the deep rural areas. These problems are shared by poor people 
virtually everywhere, but in contrast to many other countries, South Africans have significant  
resources to aid disadvantaged litigants. There are public and private programmes to increase 
rights awareness, and considerable capacity to assist litigation processes. The public legal aid 
system (which is limited and problem-ridden), is supplemented by legal NGOs, such as the 
Legal Resources Centre, the Centre for Applied Legal Studies, and the Community Law 
Centre, who provide legal assistance. While the demand for legal services is greater than the 
supply, and access is poor outside the urban centres, these organisations have played a crucial 
role in facilitating social rights litigation, by taking on test cases. They get the most senior 
advocates in the country to argue cases pro bono, and the availability of top legal expertise 
has been an extremely important resource in the successful social rights cases. Ironically, this 
extraordinary availability of legal expertise can be seen as part of the apartheid legacy. During 
the anti-apartheid struggle, legal academia and NGOs played a central role, and attracted 
many of the brightest legal minds in the country. So far, the organisations have succeeded in 
retaining well qualified people – and some who have gone on to work as advocates etc., have 
continue to do volunteer work. The question is whether and how this can be sustained in the 
long run – and replicated in other contexts.  
 
On balance, conditions for victims of social rights violations to voice their claims into the 
legal system are reasonably favourable in South Africa – but to what extent has social rights 
claims been voiced? Contrary to what might be expected, given South Africa’s status as a 
showcase for socio-economic rights litigation – not many significant social rights cases have 
been taken through the legal system. In 1999 a newspaper article complained that  
 
                                                 
15 Constitutional Court of South Africa, Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. 
CCT 23/96. 
16 Carmel Rickard, "Judges agree criminal justice system is in trouble." Sunday Times, 25 April, 1999. 
www.suntimes.co.za/1999/04/25/news/news14.htm; J. Steinberg, "Rights, crime and the courts." Business Day, 
19 April 2000. http://www.bday.co.za/bday/content/direct/1,3523,602277-6078-0,00.html  
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“… for whatever reason, few cases have been heard [in the South African 
courts] that have had the potential to affect the lives of those millions who 
remain disadvantaged. The much-proclaimed range of socio-economic rights 
has never been employed in litigation. The radical provision, which makes 
private legal relationships subject to the provisions of the Constitution, has 
been all but forgotten. Most cases involve crooks, corporations and other 
wealthy litigants.”17  
 
While this has changed somewhat, and significant social rights cases have worked their way 
through the legal system, social rights claims have been more a trickle than a flood. To 
understand why, it may be useful to look at how notable social rights cases have been 
received and decided by the courts. 
The responsiveness of South African courts’ to social rights claims 
The first case involving a constitutional social right came before the South African 
Constitutional Court in November 1997.  The Soobramoney case concerned the right to 
emergency health services, but was decided primarily on semantic grounds, rather than on the 
substantial content of the right.18 Chronic renal failure requiring regular dialysis did not 
qualify as “emergency”. The judgment disappointed proponents of social rights litigation, not 
only because the litigant lost his case, but due to statements regarding the justiciability of 
social rights. The view of the Court seemed to be that matters with significant budgetary 
implications belong in the political domain, rather than under its jurisdiction, thus distanc ing 
itself from a more radical Indian judgment on the right to emergency health services.19 In the 
South African legal community Soobramoney was taken to indicate political deference, 
discouraging further social rights litigation. Or signalling that for such cases to succeed very 
careful framing and skilful argument would be required.  
 
Three years later, in October 2000, the Court handed down judgment in the first case actually 
decided on the grounds of the social rights clauses in the Constitution. The Grootboom case 
concerned the right to housing and in particular the right of children to shelter. The applicants, 
living under appalling conditions in an informal settlement, had moved onto private land from 
which they were forcibly evicted. Camping on a nearby sports field, they applied for an order 
requiring the government to provide them with basic shelter. The Constitutional Court (unlike 
the High Court20) did not recognise a directly enforceable claim to housing on the part of the 
litigants, but ruled that the state is obliged to implement a reasonable policy for those who are 
destitute. The judgment thus establishes socio-economic rights as jus ticiable rights, and  
defines an active role for the Court in assessing social policies and their implementation at 
various levels of government. 
 
                                                 
17 Mail & Guardian "Constitutional Court rates a mere pass." Mail & Guaridan, February 25 1999. 
htp://www.mg.co.za/mg/news/99feb2/25feb-constitutional_court.html . 
18 Constitutional Court of South Africa, Soobramoney versus Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal), CCT 32/97 
(Judgment date: 27 November 1997) 
19 Paschim Banga khet Mazdoor Samity versus State of West Bengal 1996 SOL Case No. 169 (Supreme Court of 
India). 
20 The High Court stated that section 28(1)(c) of the Constitution gave all children a right to claim shelter on 
demand from the state, irrespective of the availability of resources. Furthermore, since it was in the best interest 
of the children not to be separated from their parents, the state was obliged to provide rudimentary shelter for 
these families. The judgement is reported as Grootboom v Oostenberg Municipality and Others 2000 (3) BCLR 
277(C). 
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The Grootbooms judgment was acclaimed among international academics for its creative and 
politically astute reasoning – carving out space for itself in the policy process without 
usurping the space for political decision-making.21 For prospective litigants it was, however, 
discouraging that the Constitutional Court limited its role to that of policing the policy-
making process rather than recognising an enforceable individual right to shelter, or defining 
a minimum core of the right to be given absolute priority.22  
 
The third notable socio-economic rights case heard was politically controversial, but more 
straightforward in legal terms.  The issue in Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action 
Campaign and Others (TAC),23 was whether the state was obliged, under the right of access to 
health care (section 27(1) and (2) of the 1996 Constitution) to provide the anti-retroviral drug, 
nevirapine to HIV-positive pregnant women and their newborn infants. The court found that, 
where feasible, the state was obliged to provide for all to be included in the  existing “pilot” 
policy. From a legal perspective this is less invasive than to direct government to formulate 
new policy. The expansion of the programme was also inexpensive, as the medicine would be 
supplied free of change for 5 yrs.  
 
The TAC judgment is more radical than Grootboom in the sense that it is mandatory and 
closer to acknowledging an individual, enforceable right. It also represented a huge political 
victory, and marked a turning point in the government’s position on HIV/aids.24 But, as in the 
Grootboom case, the research undertaken was formidable. The litigants outperformed the 
political authorities in their own terrain.  
 
After Grootboom other cases have built onto and developed South African jurisprudence on 
the right to housing. Particularly notable is the Constitutional Court judgment in the Kyalami 
Ridge case 25 and the Modderklip judgment from the Supreme Court of Appeal26. 
 
The Kyalami Ridge case arose when, after a flood in Alexandra Township, the government 
sought to establish a temporary transit camp on state-owned land. Nearby residents asked the 
High Court to restrain the Minister of Public Works from establishing the camp, which was 
not supported by legislation, contravened existing regulations, and undertaken without 
consultation. The High Court found in favour of the Residents Association, while the 
Constitutional Court underscored the government ’s constitutional obligation to provide access 
to adequate housing, including temporary relief for people living in intolerable conditions or 
in crisis due to natural disasters or threats of demolition. As the camp was intended to give 
effect to this constitutional obligation, the government’s decision was held lawful.  
 
                                                 
21 Cass R. Sustein, “Social and Economic Rights? Lessons from South Africa” 11 Constitutional Forum, 2001. 
22 Theunis  Roux, “Understanding Grootboom – A response to Cass R. Sunstein” 12 Constitutional Forum; Roux 
(2004); David Bilchitz, 'Placing basic needs at the centre of socio-economic rights jurisprudence'. ESR Review 4, 
2003; Sandy Liebenberg , ”South Africa’s Evolving Jurisprudence on Socio-Economic Rights: An effective Tool 
in Challenging Poverty?” 6 (2) Law Democracy and Development, 159, 2002. 
23 Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC), 2002 10 BCLR 1033. (Judgment on 5 July 2002). 
24 Mark Heywood,  'Contempt or compliance? The TAC case after the Constitutional Court judgment'. ESR 
Review 4, 2003. 
25South African Constitutional Court, Minister of Public Works and Others v Kyalami Ridge Environmental 
Association and Others 2001 (7) BCLR 652 (CC). (Judgment delivered on 29 May 2001) 
26 South African Constitutional Court, Modder East Squatters, Greater Benoni City Council v Modderklip 
Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, (SCA 187/03); President of the RSA and others  v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, (SCA 
213/03) (jointly referred to as Modderklip). My presentation of the case draws from Annette Christmas 
“Property rights of landowners va. socio-economic rights of occupiers” in ECR Review, Vol 5, No. 3, July 2004, 
at http://communitylawcentre.org.za/ser/esr_review.php. 
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In the Modderklip judgment, the Supreme Court of Appeal consolidated the protection to 
vulnerable occupiers, ruling that the state’s responsibility towards people in desperate need 
includes the obligation to ensure humane evictions, which entails making available alternative 
accommodation. Balancing the rights of the occupiers against those of the  landowners, the 
court underscored that the latter should not be prejudiced by the State’s failure to fulfil its 
obligations. It thus ordered that the landowner was entitled to damages from the state in terms 
of existing expropriation legislation, while occupiers were entitled to occupy the land until 
alternative land was made available.  
 
Lastly, the judgment in the Khosa/Mahlaule case concerns the right of access to social 
assistance for permanent residents (here Mozambican citizen).27 The issue was a decision to 
exclude non-citizens from the programmes. The majority of the court decided that the 
litigants, and all similarly situated, had a right to access social assistance, and remedied the 
legislation by reading in the words "or permanent resident" after "South Africa citizen". The 
Constitutional Court’s approach in this case is less cautious than in previous judgments. In the 
context of significant public xenophobia, it ruled to protect long-term permanent residents 
from the degradation of poverty - a decision with potentially grave budgetary implications. 
“This decision must thus be regarded as a positive portent for expanding access to socio-
economic rights through constitutional litigation in the future.”28 
 
To sum up, it seems that a main factor in ‘stemming the tide’ of social rights cases have been 
the signals sent by the Constitutional Court that it takes a lot to succeed with such claims – 
although the most recent judgments, providing classes of litigants with a legally enforceable 
rights, may increase prospective social rights litigants’ expectations. 
  
What explains the South African courts’ reluctance to give effect to individual’s social rights 
claims? According to the framework, courts’ response to such claims are in part a 
consequence of the manner in which they are voiced, but also depends on the legal basis for 
social rights; the legal culture; and the judges’ sensitivity to social rights issues.  
 
In international terms and compared to the pre-1994 situation, South African courts have a 
sound legal basis for adjudicating on socio-economic rights. The social and economic rights – 
to housing, health services, food, water, social security and education – was included in the 
Constitution to enable it to serve as instrument for principled social transformation, and not a 
shield for protecting the status quo and the vested interests of the privileged. This ambition is 
also reflected in the provisions enabling affirmative action and horizontal application of rights 
(Sections 9 and 8).  
 
For most of the social rights, the State’s responsibility is, limited to “take reasonable 
legislative and other measures within its available resources to achieve the progressive 
realisation of these rights” (Sections 26(2), 27(2)). The exceptions, which apparently give rise 
to directly enforceable claims, are the right not to be evicted (Section 26(3)); not to be refused 
emergency medical treatment (Section 27(3)); the rights of prisoners to adequate nutrition and 
medical treatment (Section 35(2)) and the rights of Children (defined as those under 18 yrs) to 
                                                 
27 South African Constitutional Court, Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development and Another (CCT 
12/03); Mahlaule and Others v Minister of Social Development and Another (CCT 13/03) (combined judgment 
referred to as Khosa/Mahlaule) (Delivered on 4 March 2004). My presentation draws on Julia Sloth-Nielsen 
“Extending access to social assistance to permanent residents”, ECR Review, Vol. 5, No. 3, July 2004, at 
http://communitylawcentre.org.za/ser/esr_review.php.   
28 Sloth-Nielsen (2004). 
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basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care and social services (Section 28). The 'bite' is, 
somewhat reduced by a general limitations clause permitting limitation of rights “in terms of 
laws of general application to the extent that limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open 
and democratic society” (Section 36).29 Nevertheless, the formal constitutional basis for 
courts to adjudicate social rights issues is comparatively strong in South Africa - much 
stronger than in India, the country that pioneered social rights litigation. And when certifying 
the 1996 Constitution the South African Constitutional Court explicitly stated that social 
rights are justiciable, not merely political aspirations.30 The relatively cautious response to 
social rights thus cannot be ascribed to the lega l basis. 
 
According to the theoretical framework, courts’ responsiveness to social rights issues also 
depends on the judges’ sensitivity to the concerns voiced, which in turn is determined by the 
composition of the bench - the judges’ social and ideological background, their legal 
education and training. In South Africa, diversity on the bench has been a priority. This is 
reflected in the system and criteria for judicial appointment, and prospective judges are 
questioned on their commitment to constitutional values and social transformation. The 
judges’ sensitivity to social rights issues vary, but ongoing training aims to sensitise and 
educate judges and magistrates towards human rights.   
 
A cautious approach to social rights may also stem from the legal culture, the prevailing 
theories of constitutional interpretation and whether social rights are regarded within the 
proper domain of the courts. This in turn influences the judges’ norms of appropriateness 
regarding how to deal with social rights. Generally, the South African legal culture is 
influenced by the common-law tradition, with deference to political authority as a central 
democratic virtue. However, the injustice of apartheid law, lead many lawyers towards a 
constitutionalist perspective, where democracy is defined partly by commitment and 
adherence to basic human rights – including social rights. Post-1994 South African judges – 
particularly the first Constitutional Court bench, deciding the early,  difficult cases – seemed 
genuinely committed to social right, and saw social transformation as an important part of 
their mandate.31 However, they were also deeply concerned with the boundary between law 
and politics. To establish their legitimacy as a legal institution vis-à-vis the political 
authorities, they had to strike a balance - neither give up on social rights, nor meddle unduly 
in policy- issues. This priority informs their social rights jurisprudence and motivates a 
cautious approach.  
The capability of South African judges to adjudicate on social rights 
The third crucial stage of the litigation process is when the judge(s), accepting the validity of 
a social rights claim, give it effect in a judgement.  For the litigation to be successful, judges 
must be capable of identifying and applying legal strategies that effectively protect or advance 
the relevant rights.  
 
As noted earlier, courts have several strategies at their disposal, they may require rights to be 
respected; protected against encroachment by others; that the state actively promotes rights; 
or acts to fulfil individual claimants’ concrete social rights. Court orders may be declaratory, 
                                                 
29 Limitation clauses are common in modern democracies (see article 19(1) of the German Basic Law and article 
1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom). 
30 Constitutional Court of South Africa, Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. 
CCT 23/96.  
31 Interviews with CC judges 1997–2003. 
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merely pointing out breeches in social rights obligations; mandatory, requiring specific 
actions to be undertaken; or supervisory, ordering agencies to report on the implementation. 
The Constitutional Court judgments – particularly Soobramoney and Grootboom, but also to 
some extent TAC – have been criticised for being too deferential with regard to not intruding 
on the political domain, and too cautious in their legal remedies. Interestingly, both in 
Grootboom and TAC, the High Court went further that the Constitutional Court. In 
Grootboom The Cape High Court recognised an enforceable right of destitute children (and 
their guardians) to have shelter provided by the political authorities, while the Constitutional 
Court handed done a purely declaratory order requiring new policy to be made. In the TAC 
case, the Constitutional Court formulated a mandatory judgment, requiring the State to step up 
distribution of nevirapine to HIV positive mothers and their newborns but stopping short of 
the High Courts order, demanding that the state report back on progress within a set time 
frame.32 Recently, the Supreme Court of Appeal judgment in the Modderklip case and even 
more so the Constitutional Court in Khosa/Mahlaule have gone further in acknowledging 
individual social rights claims of vulnerable groups. 
 
Which strategy a judge or bench opts for depend partly on the nature of the case, how it is 
argued (the impact of ‘voice’); and on how the judge perceives the issue at stake in terms of 
facts and law (the impact of ‘responsiveness’). More systemic factors influencing the 
repertoire of strategies available to a judge include his or her professional skills, training, 
access to legal material and research assistance, and opportunities to participate in 
professional forums.  
 
While this might be decisive for judges’ professional ability to find the most adequate means 
to enforce the right, the capability to actually go for what is best on professional grounds – 
against the will of powerful state (or private) actors – also depends on the independence of the 
judiciary as a collective and of the individual judge.33  
 
The South African Constitutional Court has excellent conditions for developing a broad 
repertoire of legal strategies: highly qualified judges, an excellent library, ample research 
assistance, and authority to draw on diverse sources of law, including international law and 
case material from foreign jurisdictions. They hear cases as one bench and represent between 
them a wealth of legal and other experience – and with a light case load they have the time to 
deliberate and reflect on suitable remedies for each particular case, as well as on the wider 
jurisprudential implications. In this respect, hardly any court, anywhere, has better conditions 
for developing sound judicial strategies for giving effect to social rights.  
 
But do South African judges have sufficient independence to act on their professional 
judgement?  Institutional mechanisms to guard against undue political influence are in place 
(constitutionally protected independence, secure tenure and remuneration, a circumscribed 
role for the executive in the appointment process, transparent nomination by the judicial 
service commission). However, the concern for legitimacy vis-à-vis the political authorities, 
                                                 
32 See Heywood (ibid). 
33 Judicial independence is the ability of judges to decide cases on the basis of their interpretation of the law and 
the facts of the case, without interference (actual or threatened) by government or other agents, and the ability of 
the courts to make their decisions ‘stick’. See Gloppen et al (ed). (2004). The growing literature on judicial 
accountability includes Peter H. Russell and David M. O’Brien, (eds),  Judicial Independence in the Age of 
Democracy: Critical Perspectives from Around the World  (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 
2001); Steven B. Burbank and Barry Friedman (2002) Judicial independence at the crossroads : an 
interdisciplinary approach . Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications; and Andrâas Sajâo, A. and Lorri R. 
Bentch, Judicial integrity. (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004). 
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may restrain the freedom of the judiciary to act contrary to government interests - particularly 
in a political context with a dominant ruling party. Those appointed to the Constitutional 
Court have also generally been ideologically close to the ANC government.  
 
But the Court’s also needs to generate legitimacy in other important constituencies (within the 
legal community, nationally and internationally, with the political opposition and in civil 
society), and this may induce it to look for opportunities to demonstrate its independence. For 
the Constitutional Court the relationship with the legal community is particularly important. 
As a novel institution, and comprising members with scant judicial experience – it was 
paramount to establish itself as a sound and respected institution on professional legal 
grounds. To earn respect for their legal craftsmanship seems to have been a main 
consideration, tying the court somewhat closer to conventional legal reasoning than the 
ideological disposition of the individuals on the bench might suggest.34    
 
Judges rarely admit to taking strategic considerations into account, but on the basis of the 
Constitutional Court’s position vis-à-vis political society, we might expect judgments that 
generally affirm and support the political position of the government, but that contain limited 
and highly visible challenges to state policies. And so far, this is what has been forthcoming.35 
South African social rights jurisprudence: Authority, compliance 
and implementation 
As noted earlier, compliance can be seen in terms of whether the relevant authorities 
(verbally) accept the rulings as authoritative ; comply with the terms of court order and to what 
extent the ruling has implications for subsequent legislation, policies and administrative 
action – including ways in which other bodies with a mandate in this field,  such as human 
right commissions, relate to the judgement.36  
 
The South African government has generally accepted adverse judgments, but with regard to 
the main social rights judgements, there has been noticeable foot-dragging.37 With regard to 
the Grootboom judgement, 
 
“The SA Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) has been monitoring the 
situation (…)  it took one year for the local administration (the City of Cape 
Town) and the Western Cape provincial administration to finally decide where 
'the locus of responsibility' lay with regard to the implementation of the 
Grootboom judgment. Even after this one-year period of inaction, the efforts 
by these two administrations to implement Grootboom is limited to putting 
together a plan to deal with the permanent resettlement of the Wallacedene 
Community. There is a clear lack of understanding that the judgment requires 
systemic changes to national, provincial and local housing programmes to 
cater for people in desperate and crisis situations.” (Pillay 2002)  
                                                 
34 For an elaborate analysis of the Consitutional Courts negotiation of its relations to various consituencies, see 
Gloppen (2001). 
35 See analysis in Roux 2002, 2004. 
36 See S. Liebenberg (2003). 
37 Pillay, K. 2002. 'Implementing Grootboom:Supervision Needed'. ESR Review 3; see also S Liebenberg 
(2002); S Liebenberg (2003) ”Making A Difference: Human Rights and Development-Reflecting the South 
African Experience” (Research paper presented at the Nobel Symposium on the Right to Development and 
Human Rights in Development held in Oslo, Norway on 13-15 October 2003) Roux (2004) and Heywood 
(2003). 
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Also regarding the voluntary settlement to provide the litigants with temporary 
accommodation, compliance was slow and partial (Pillay 2002). 
 
Concerning the TAC case, government representatives made statements indicating that they 
were not prepared to let the courts dictate their policies. But once the ‘defeat’ was clear, they 
turned – at least in terms of rhetoric – and committed to changing their policies. However, 
monitoring of compliance has shown that implementation has been slow and uneven between 
the provinces. (Heywood 2003). Mpumalanga province failed to take steps to implement the 
judgement, despite having the capacity to do so, and the Treatment Action Campaign decided 
to instigate contempt of court proceeding - which seemed to have an effect (Heywood 2003). 
 
This illustrates a point briefly discussed earlier, namely that litigation should not be viewed on 
it own. In the TAC case, litigation was part of a larger process of social mobilisation, and the 
case was effectively won on the streets before the verdict was handed down. This does not 
mean that litigation was irrelevant. On the contrary, it provided a focal point and platform for 
the struggle. 
 
But what explains this failure to promptly implement the judgments? As we have seen, this 
can in part be ascribed to the nature of the judgments themselves. They rarely place concrete 
demands on the authorities regarding concrete measures to be undertaken, nor set timeframes 
within which this should be done.   
 
Lack of capacity – financial, institutional and administrative - is another aspect, but political 
and normative factors are probably as important. Political factors include the balance of 
power between political forces, political will and whether the rulings are at cross purposes 
with the governments’ broader policy goals.38 
 
Lack of political will seems to be a factor. In the TAC case, this was related to personal 
idiosyncrasies in the political leadership, profoundly politicising HIV/Aids policy. This is 
reinforced by the power structure, differences in political culture and diverging views on the 
nature of South African constitutionalism.  
 
The uneven balance of power in South Africa, with the ANC as the dominant political party, 
presents particular challenges. On the one hand, the space for contestation offered by the 
courts, and their role as guardians of democratic ideals and constitutional rights is particularly 
important when there is a lack of other forces able to sanction the government when it acts in 
breech of its mandate. This accountability function is central to the Constitutional Court’s 
ration d’etre and its legitimacy with the domestic oppositions as well as internationally. On 
the other hand, if the Court is perceived to repeatedly undermine the government’s legitimate 
policy aspirations, this may jeopardize its legitimacy with the ruling party, expose the 
counter-majoritarian dilemma inherent in strong constitutionalism, and make the Court 
vulnerable to infringement of its authority. 39  
 
There is a marked normative ambivalence in South Africa – and within the current ANC 
leadership – concerning the proper role of law in relation to politics. There is broad 
                                                 
38 For a discussion of capacity and capacity development in relation to social rights realisation, see Ida-Eline 
Engh ”Developing capacity to realise socio-economic rights: The example of HIV/Aids and the right to food in 
South Africa” ESR Review,Vol 5, No. 3, July 2004. 
39 See Gloppen (2000) and Gloppen et al (eds.) 2004. 
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commitment to the Constitution, but the liberal understanding of courts as a check on power, 
competes with other understandings, where the role of law primarily is to facilitate policy-
implementation.40 This brings us back to the initial discussion, on the disagreements over the 
proper locus for social rights – do they belong in the constitution as anything other than a 
statement of aspirations? Competing understandings of constitutionalism in South African 
political society may be a partial explanation for the lack of commitment to implement 
judgements seen to trespass on the political domain.  
 
Despite disappointments, it  is important to also remember the achievements gained - the 
judgments have to some extent been implemented and reflected in policies and legislation, 
and they remain important yardsticks that other institutions, such as the Human Rights 
Commission, use in their work to further social rights. And they continue to be important foci 
for social mobilisation around social rights issues. 
Assessing social rights litigation as a strategy in fulfilling rights 
Has this analysis brought us closer to understanding the potential and limitations of litigation 
as a strategy in fulfilling social rights? What is clear is that social rights can not be achieved 
by litigation alone. The impact of litigation is bound to be limited, even under the favourable  
conditions prevailing in South Africa in the past decade - where the ideological commitment 
to constitutionalism and social rights is strong, both in civil society and  within the judiciary, 
and where the ideal of social transformation and progressive realisation of social rights has 
also been prominent in political society.    
 
While not sufficient, social rights litigation can clearly be useful to improve the social rights 
condition in society. But it should not be the regarded as the main avenue. The central 
purpose of social rights – as other rights – is first and foremost to commit and direct the 
people’s elected representatives in their work to carry out their political mandate. Normally 
prospects for success might be greater by political mobilisation. But where there are 
blockages in the political system so that the voice of those deprived of their rights does not get 
though, litigation may be an alternative or complementary strategy.  
 
Social rights litigation can play a cons tructive role – and has done so in South Africa as well 
as in other parts of the world.  But it is demanding. For litigants to succeed, several conditions 
must be present, and not all of them are easy to reform at will. With regard to some of the  
factors that the analysis has identified as significant post apartheid South Africa has been in a 
unique position. One factor is the constitution itself (although the nature of the text is less 
unique than the interpretation given it by the courts). The quality of the judiciary, and in 
particular the first bench of the Constitutional Court has been crucial. Likewise the 
availability of resources for social rights litigation, both financial and in terms of quality of 
the legal expertise made available. These factors are difficult to replicate elsewhere. And they 
might also be difficult to sustain in South Africa in the future. 
 
                                                 
40 See Gloppen(2000). 
  
Summary 
 
The paper analyses the role of litigation as a strategy 
to fulfil the social rights laid down in the South 
African constitution. Critically examining litigation 
as a means to bring the constitutional provisions to 
life, it explores how different aspects of the social, 
political and legal context condition the litigation 
process. Focus is on the social rights cases that the 
South African Constitutional Court has decided over 
the past decade. Comparative perspectives set the 
South Africa experience in relief, and inform the 
theoretical framework structuring the analysis. By 
systematically examining the South African 
experience, the aim is to shed light on what has been 
achieved through social rights litigation; what has 
facilitated these achievements; and future prospects 
for social rights litigation in South Africa. 
Furthermore, it aims to extract some general insights 
into the potential and limits of litigation as a strategy 
for advancing social rights. 
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